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Abstract
Social scientists face the challenge of determining whether their data are valid, yet they lack prac-
tical guidance about how to do so. Existing publications on data validation provide mostly abstract
information for creating one’s own dataset or establishing that an existing one is adequate. Fur-
ther, they tend to pit validation techniques against each other, rather than explain how to combine
multiple approaches. By contrast, this paper provides a practical guide to data validation in which
tools are used in a complementary fashion to identify the strengths and weaknesses of a dataset and
thus reveal how it can most e↵ectively be used. We advocate for three approaches, each incorporat-
ing multiple tools: 1) assessing content validity through an examination of the resonance, domain,
di↵erentiation, fecundity, and consistency of the measure; 2) evaluating data generation validity
through an investigation of dataset management structure, data sources, coding procedures, aggre-
gation methods, and geographic and temporal coverage; and 3) assessing convergent validity using
case studies and empirical comparisons among coders and among measures. We apply our method
to corruption measures from a new dataset, Varieties of Democracy. We show that the data are
generally valid and we emphasize that a particular strength of the dataset is its capacity for analysis
across countries and over time. These corruption measures represent a significant contribution to
the field because, although research questions have focused on geographic di↵erences and temporal
trends, other corruption datasets have not been designed for this type of analysis.
Acknowledgments: The authors are grateful to Nancy Bermeo, Ellen Lust, Gerardo Munck, Andreas Schedler and V-Dem colleagues for their
comments on an earlier version of this paper and to Talib Jabbar and Andrew Slivka for their research assistance. This research project was supported
by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; by the Knut & Alice
Wallenberg Foundation to Wallenberg Academy Fellow Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; by the Swedish Research
Council, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden & Jan Teorell, Department of Political Science, Lund University,
Sweden; and by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES-1423944, PI: Daniel Pemstein. Jan Teorell also wishes to acknowledge support
from the Wenner-Gren Foundation. We performed simulations and other computational tasks using resources provided by the Notre Dame Center for
Research Computing (CRC) through the High Performance Computing section, and by the Swedish National Infrastructure for Computing (SNIC) at the
National Supercomputer Centre in Sweden. We specifically acknowledge the assistance of In-Saeng Suh at CRC and Johan Raber at SNIC in facilitating
our use of their respective systems.
1 Introduction
Most political science researchers explicitly or implicitly deal with data validity concerns in their work.
Yet, there is still no cohesive answer to the question: “How do I know whether my data are valid?”
While methods of data analysis have advanced substantially over the last decade, few scholars rig-
orously examine data validity and reliability prior to data analysis. As Herrera and Kapur [2007]
wrote,“Inattentiveness to data quality is, unfortunately, business as usual in political science” (p. 366).
Past validation literature has made valuable contributions, but there is room for improvement. Val-
idation advice typically focuses on satisficing standards: What does a researcher have to do to show a
dataset is “valid enough” or “reliable enough”? Many of these approaches lack practical tools for evalu-
ating the strengths and weaknesses of a dataset, instead relying on the ability to show that a particular
dataset is simply better than the next best alternative. One reason for this inherent competition may
be that “the truth” - the ultimate rubric against which to judge dataset validity - is unknowable, mean-
ing validity assessments often rely more on a scholar’s ability to argue than a dataset’s alignment with
reality. Moreover, some scholars seem to pit one validity approach against another rather than allowing
approaches to serve as robustness checks for each other. Finally, few researchers take what they learn
in assessing the dataset and use it when analyzing the dataset; the assessment serves to put a rubber
stamp on the dataset, but rarely does a researcher draw on the strengths and weaknesses of a dataset
in analysis. Yet, considering the majority of scholars use pre-existing datasets in their research, it is
vitally important for us to understand how to responsibly use these datasets: how to diagnose dataset
strengths and limitations, map their implications in empirical work, and implement mitigation strategies
to address them.
To address these gaps in the validity literature, this paper proposes a set of complementary, flexible,
practical, and methodologically rigorous tools for assessing dataset validity and reliability. Rather than
recommending use of one tool over another, we advocate a comprehensive approach to assessment. We
draw heavily on Schedler [2012], who stated that, “For measurement to be scientific, it must be grounded
in shared concepts, shared realities, and shared rules of translation” (p. 21). The tools we propose assess
the degree to which a dataset aligns with shared concepts (content validation), shared rules of translation
(data generation validation), and shared realities (convergent validation). Collectively, the assessment
tools proposed here are intended to help scholars more thoroughly and transparently evaluate both the
process of generating data and the data themselves.
We use these tools to evaluate a new dataset on corruption, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
corruption data.1 The V-Dem corruption data cover all countries of the world, extend from 1900 to the
1The analysis completed in this paper used v4 of the V-Dem dataset.
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present, and are based on expert surveys. Our purpose here is twofold: to illustrate how these tools
might be used; and to assess the validity and reliability of the V-Dem data so that other scholars can use
them more e↵ectively. These purposes are well-suited to each other because corruption is particularly
di cult to measure: the definition commonly used in the literature - the use of public o ce for private
gain - is challenging to translate into measures (operationalize), and people’s sensitivity about corruption
hinders data collection.
Our tests for content, data generation, and convergent validity provide considerable evidence for the
quality of the V-Dem corruption measures. We do find data from certain country-years, where the V-
Dem coders disagree the most, less reliable and thus caution others to proceed carefully when using those
data. Our analysis also reveals that female coders rate countries, on average, as more corrupt on a few
of the V-Dem indicators. We encourage users of the dataset to consider two di↵erent implications of this
finding. First, V-Dem data may reflect more corruption than other datasets, all else equal, especially
for those country-years with more female coders. Second, to the extent that coder representativeness is
inherently valuable, this is a strength of the V-Dem dataset. Finally, applying our data validity tools to
V-Dem corruption measures emphasizes their validity for analyses across countries and over time. This
is a significant strength considering that these analyses are common in corruption research, yet many of
the existing datasets have not been designed to undertake this type of work.
In sum, the paper provides a practical guide to data validation, demonstrates the value of these tools
as applied to the V-Dem corruption measures, and identifies weakness and strengths of the V-Dem data
to facilitate their use by others. The next section examines the existing literature on data validation.
We then acquaint the reader with our proposed approach and tools and the logic behind them. The
section that follows introduces the V-Dem measures. We then apply our tools to those measures. The
conclusion summarizes our data validation approach and findings about the V-Dem indicators.
2 Past Approaches to Validating Measures
How do I know whether my data are valid? In response to this question, many scholars have helpfully
prescribed what valid data should look like. Yet, the standards in this literature are often highly abstract,
which makes mapping them to real-world datasets challenging. Two of these works - Coppedge [2012]
and Gerring [2001] - are designed to orient students of social science to the research process. Both of
these books usefully examine criteria that one should employ when conceptualizing a theory and then
translating that theory into measurable indicators. Similarly, Adcock [2001] walks through the steps to
form a systemized concept and establish equivalence in measurement across domains of observation. The
end of the article provides considerable detail, discussing content validation, convergent/discriminant
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validation, and nomological/construct validation. All three works stop short, however, of providing a
practical guide for data validation. Coppedge [2012] and Gerring [2001] provide example situations that
are more simple and straightforward than what we typically encounter in our research. Adcock [2001]
does not describe how to assess the types of validity he considers, focusing instead on isolated examples
of what to emulate or avoid.
The literature has also tended to treat approaches to validation as competing camps, rather than using
them as complements of one another. This is exemplified by Seawright and Collier [2014]. They usefully
build on Collier’s past work by posing four alternative approaches to validation: levels-of-measurement
tradition, structural-equation modeling with latent variables, pragmatic, and case-based. Yet, as implied
by the use of the word “rival” in the title of the article, this piece argues that these approaches all
have strengths and weaknesses and that researchers should choose their approach carefully, rather than
integrate them.
An additional oversight in the literature is that many scholars approach data validity challenges as
if all researchers are building datasets from scratch. If they are examined at all, existing datasets are
typically torn down without advice about how to proceed with conducting research. The implication
of much of the literature is that a slightly less valid measure is as bad as a completely invalid measure:
neither is worth using. Only the dataset that wins out as the most valid should remain in circulation:
a “survival of the fittest” approach to dataset maintenance. There is very little attention to how to
mitigate, or at least acknowledge, inherited problems such as poor mapping from a construct to a
measure or obvious sources of measurement error. This is true of even one of the more comprehensive
and nuanced analyses of data validation: Herrera and Kapur [2007] approach data collection “as an
operation performed by data actors in a supply chain” (p. 366). They delineate these actors, their
incentives, and their capabilities. They urge scholars to focus on data validity, coverage, and accuracy,
and they o↵er several examples of datasets that have failed on these dimensions. But, they fall short
of telling the reader how to assess existing datasets for their strengths and weaknesses and incorporate
this information into their use (also see Mudde and Schedler [2010] and the mini-symposium in Political
Research Quarterly).
While we acknowledge these weaknesses in the data validation literature, we also draw ideas from it
in order to develop our own approach and tools below: concepts from Adcock, Gerring, and Herrera and
Kapur, among others, play key roles. Likewise, we build on works that have examined the validity of a
specific measure or set of measures. For example, our approach is informed by the large literature on
the validity of democracy measures. Contributors to this literature have emphasized the importance of
aligning measures with the higher-level conceptualization [Munck and Verkuilen, 2002, Bowman et al.,
2005, Coppedge et al., 2011] and considering di↵erences in coverage, the use of di↵erent sources, and the
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use of di↵erent scales across measures [Bowman et al., 2005]. These works have also highlighted how
critical transparency is. If a data source fails to transparently publicize its coding rules, aggregation
choices, and measurement model details, assessing data validity is challenging [Coppedge et al., 2011,
Munck and Verkuilen, 2002]. Works on democracy, as well as human rights, also provide useful insight
for us into the validity of aggregation procedures, as these measures are typically indices constructed
from lower-level indicators [Munck and Verkuilen, 2002, Bowman et al., 2005, Coppedge et al., 2011,
Fariss, 2014, Pemstein et al., 2010]. To develop tools for convergent validity, we draw heavily on the
work of Steenbergen and Marks [2007] and Martinez i Coma and van Ham [2015], who represent two
additional validation literatures, those on party positions and election integrity, respectively. Finally, we
use insights from the literature on the validity of corruption data, both because we apply our approach to
corruption measures but also because the literature raises issues about data validation in general [Knack,
2007, Treisman, 2007, Knack, 2007, Hawken and Munck, 2009a,b, Galtung, 2006].
3 Data Validity Evaluation Approach and Tools
Responding to gaps in the existing literature, we provide a data validation strategy that o↵ers practical,
complementary tools useful to identifying strengths and weaknesses of datasets and employing that
information when using those datasets. As a starting point, we define validity as the absence of systematic
measurement error and reliability as the absence of unsystematic (or random) measurement error. A
dataset that o↵ers valid and reliable estimates of reality is preferable to a dataset that o↵ers unreliable
unbiased estimates or one that o↵ers reliable biased estimates. And of course, the least usable dataset
is one that unreliably o↵ers a biased estimate of reality. Throughout this paper “validity” refers to this
technical meaning provided here, as well as simply quality data that are free of both systematic and
random measurement error (valid and reliable). Each context will make the meaning clear to the reader.
We recommend evaluating the level of error by considering a dataset’s alignment with shared concepts,
rules of translation, and realities, to use Schelder’s terms [Schedler, 2012]. Past literature on data
validity has focused particularly on comparing data to reality, in other words aiming to assess validity by
evaluating alignment with shared realities. This is the approach employed in works such as Donchev and
Ujhelyi [2014], Pemstein et al. [2010] and Fariss [2014]. The fundamental challenge in assessing validity
in this manner is that we do not know the “true scores.” If we had access to the “dataset of truth,”
we could evaluate existing datasets on their alignment with reality. In the absence of such a “dataset of
truth,” we are left comparing the datasets we have to case studies and existing datasetss.
In addition to assessing alignment with shared reality, we advocate assessing a dataset given its
alignment with a shared concept and shared rules of translation. This latter piece has been largely
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overlooked in the validation literature. We propose to evaluate whether the data generating process
is unbiased and reliable. The assumption behind this approach is that an unbiased and reliable data
generating process results in unbiased and reliable data. The strength of this approach is that it allows
us to focus on something we can evaluate (i.e., the nature of a process) rather than something we cannot
(i.e., a dataset’s alignment with the truth). For example, though we cannot prove that a coder selected
the “true” answer when coding Argentina’s level of civil society freedoms in 1950, we can show that the
process to recruit, engage, and synthesize data from that coder was unbiased and reliable.
Rather than assert that our approach to assessing validity should replace another, or that, in fact, any
one approach is supreme, we put forth the idea that data validity should be assessed using all possible
tools. These tools are complements, not substitutes.
Along with this, we encourage a departure from the “good enough” standards for validity. Validity
is a continuous trait, not a binary one. On the spectrum of validity, there is no threshold a dataset must
reach in order to be put into use. All datasets o↵er strengths and weaknesses, and it is important to
understand and acknowledge them. A discipline that rejects datasets that cannot meet a standard of
validity will be one that “teaches to the test,” encouraging the proliferation of datasets that look like
each other, that use previously vetted measurement approaches, or that align with the most well-known
cases. We undertake this validity assessment to generate information, not rubber stamp approval.
Bearing all of this in mind, we propose three categories of tools to assess the validity of a dataset.
They are outlined in Table 1 and described in detail in section five, where we also apply them to the
V-Dem measures. Prior to those tasks, we provide a brief introduction to the V-Dem measures.
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CRITERION CATEGORY GUIDING QUESTIONS TECHNIQUES
Alignment with
Shared Concepts
Content Validity
Assessment
To what extent does the measure
capture the higher-level theoret-
ical construct it is intended to
capture and exclude irrelevant
elements?
To what extent is the mea-
sure useful to research?
Evaluate the resonance, domain,
di↵erentiation, fecundity, consis-
tency of the measure.
Evaluate the causal utility
of the measure.
Alignment with
Shared Rules
of Translation
Data
Generation
Validity
Assessment
Does the data generating process
introduce any biases or analytical
issues?
How does it compare to the
data generating process of
alternative measures?
Evaluate dataset management
structure, data sources, coding
procedures, aggregation meth-
ods, and geographic and tempo-
ral coverage for each question.
Alignment with
Shared Realities
Convergent
Validity
Assessment
Does the measure accurately
capture actual cases?
Where multiple coders exist,
to what extent do they converge?
To what extent do the data
produced by the measure cor-
relate with data produced by
other measures of the construct,
and are areas of low correlation
thoroughly understood?
Evaluate data against original or
existing case studies.
Evaluate extent of disagree-
ment among coders, whether
disagreement varies systemati-
cally with level of di culty, and
extent to which coder character-
istics predict their responses.
Evaluate strength of correla-
tions, any outliers, and the
implications of these findings.
Table 1: Tools to Assess Data Validity
4 V-Dem Corruption Measures
The V-Dem corruption measure is an index of six indicators of di↵erent forms of corruption based on
original data from country experts.2 Data have been collected for all countries of the world from 1900
to 2012 with updates to the current year in-progress. Multiple coders, at least three fifths of whom
are native to the countries in question, were used to code each country-year observation, and the coder
recruitment procedures and coding procedures were consistent over time and across countries. An item
response theory (IRT) measurement model was used to aggregate the experts’ responses.
The exact language of the six corruption indicators appears in Table 2. Additional details about
the V-Dem data, including how the V-Dem Corruption Index was developed, are provided below in the
evaluation of their validity.
2The V-Dem Corruption Index uses all the corruption variables available from V-Dem except for one, which pertains
to corruption in the media, rather than corruption in government.
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INDICATOR QUESTION CATEGORIES
v2exbribe
Executive bribery
and corrupt
exchanges
How routinely do members of the ex-
ecutive (the head of state, the head of
government, and cabinet ministers), or
their agents, grant favors in exchange
for bribes, kickbacks, or other material
inducements?
0: It is routine and expected.
1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the
executive.
2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the
executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will
be necessary.
3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.
4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.
v2exembez
Executive
embezzlement
and theft
How often do members of the executive
(the head of state, the head of govern-
ment, and cabinet ministers), or their
agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropri-
ate public funds or other state resources
for personal or family use?
0: Constantly. Act as though all public resources were their
personal or family property.
1: Often. Responsible stewards of selected public resources
but treat the rest like personal property.
2: About half the time. About as likely to be responsible
stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat
them like personal property.
3: Occasionally. Responsible stewards of most public re-
sources but treat selected others like personal property.
4: Never, or hardly ever. Almost always responsible stew-
ards of public resources and keep them separate from per-
sonal or family property.
v2excrptps
Public sector
corrupt exchanges
How routinely do public sector employ-
ees grant favors in exchange for bribes,
kickbacks, or other material induce-
ments?
0: Constantly. Act as though all public resources were their
personal or family property.
1: Often. Responsible stewards of selected public resources
but treat the rest like personal property.
2: About half the time. About as likely to be responsible
stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat
them like personal property.
3: Occasionally. Responsible stewards of most public re-
sources but treat selected others like personal property.
4: Never, or hardly ever. Almost always responsible stew-
ards of public resources and keep them separate from per-
sonal or family property.
v2exthftps
Public sector
theft
How often do public sector employees
steal, embezzle, or misappropriate pub-
lic funds or other state resources for
personal or family use?
0: Constantly. Act as though all public resources were their
personal/family property.
1: Often. Responsible stewards of selected public resources
but treat the rest like personal property.
2: About half the time. About as likely to be responsible
stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat
them like personal property.
3: Occasionally. Responsible stewards of most public re-
sources but treat selected others like personal property.
4: Never, or hardly ever. Almost always responsible stew-
ards of public resources and keep them separate from per-
sonal or family property.
v2lgcrrpt
Legislature
corrupt activities
Do members of the legislature abuse
their position for financial gain?
0: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these
activities.
1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activ-
ities.
2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these
activities.
3: Very occasionally. May be a few but the vast majority
do not.
4: Never, or hardly ever.
v2jucorrdc
Judicial corruption
decision
How often do individuals or businesses
make undocumented extra payments or
bribes in order to speed up or delay the
process or to obtain a favorable judicial
decision?
0: Always.
1: Usually.
2: About half of the time.
3: Not usually.
4: Never.
Table 2: V-Dem Corruption Indicators
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5 Demonstration of the Tools and Validation of V-Dem Cor-
ruption Measures
To what extent are the V-Dem measures of corruption valid? More specifically, to what extent do they
have su ciently low levels of systematic measurement error and su ciently low levels of unsystematic
measurement error? To answer these questions we apply our data validation tools and in doing so provide
additional guidance about how to use them.
5.1 Content Validity Assessment
As a first step in assessing the validity of a measure, we propose evaluating the degree to which a measure
maps to a theoretical construct or its content validity. We break this task down into consideration of six
properties: resonance, domain, di↵erentiation, fecundity, consistency, and causal utility [Gerring, 2001].
Gerring proposes these as important attributes of concepts; we suggest that they can also be helpful in
assessing measures. We find that the first five are useful to checking whether a measure captures the
higher-level theoretical construct it is intended to capture while excluding irrelevant elements. The sixth
property, causal utility, is a more instrumental version of this, ensuring that the measures captures the
construct in a way that is actually helpful to conducting research. In this section we also demonstrate
that the V-Dem corruption measures exhibit each of these characteristics and that because of this the
V-Dem indicators o↵er some advantages over corruption measures from other datasets.3
For resonance, a measure should reflect how the underlying concept is used. The V-Dem corruption
measures resonate with the accepted academic usage of the term corruption as the use of public o ce
for private gain. Each of the six indicators refers to a public o ceholder, specifically members of the
executive, members of the legislature, public sector employees, and, indirectly, members of the judiciary.
Each of these indicators also refers to private gain, either with explicit language, such as “material
inducements,” “personal or family use,” “financial gain,” or implicitly with terms such as “undocumented
extra payments or bribes” (in the case of the judicial indicator). The public o ce and private gain are
linked together with phrases that connote a trade o↵ of public for private welfare, including “grant favors
in exchange,” “steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds,” or “abuse their position.” The judicial
indicator again di↵ers in this case by focusing on the citizen as actor, but nonetheless links public o cials
3Information regarding other corruption datasets gathered from Afrobarometer, Rounds 2-6, 2002-2015, Arab Barom-
eter, 2006-2007, 2010-2014, Asiabarometer, 2003-2006, Caucasus Barometer, Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2008
and 2010-2013, Corporacion Latinobarmetro, Latinobarmetro, 2001-2011, 2013, and 2015, Former Yugoslavia Barometer,
2005, New Baltic Barometer, 2001, 2004, New Europe Barometer, 2001, 2004, 2005, New Russia Barometer, 2005-2012,
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, 1999-
2014, Kaufmann et al., Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2012-2014, Kaufmann and Stone, PRS
Group, ICRG Methodology, Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer, 2004-2013, United Nations Interre-
gional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 1992, 1996, and 2000, World Values Survey Association, World Values Survey,
1995-1998, 2010-2014.
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to the corrupt act by asking to what extent people use undocumented extra payments or bribes “to speed
up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision.”4
The idea of domain takes resonance one step further to consider whether the measure captures the
meaning for the relevant audiences. The domain of the V-Dem corruption measures is the meaning of
corruption as discussed by scholars and policy makers. This domain does not include language referring
to corruption as it is discussed in the lay community, which often applies a broader definition; we are not
interested in capturing all instances where non-specialists, media, and pundits use the word corruption
as a label for a behavior of which they do not approve. By including di↵erent types and forms of
corruption, the V-Dem measures capture varied conceptualizations of corruption within the domain,
thus strengthening the index’s content validity [Trochim and Donnelly, 2001]. The V-Dem Corruption
Index includes executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic corruption, as well as grand and petty.
It also covers di↵erent corruption forms, specifying bribes, undocumented extra payments, kickbacks,
contracts for personal gain, future employment, theft, embezzlement and misappropriation, while also
including the catch-all term “material inducements.”
The comprehensive nature of the V-Dem measures is one of its strengths, relative to other datasets.
By their own descriptions, many of the other corruption datasets gather information about “public sec-
tor” or bureaucratic corruption, excluding executive, legislative, and judicial corruption. This includes
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the World Bank’s Business Environ-
ment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), and nearly all the Barometers.5 Ambiguously,
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) combines data on the public sector
with private “big interests.” By contrast, International Country Risk Guides Political Risk Services
(ICRG) focuses on the “political system.” The World Values Survey (WVS) o↵ers a more expansive
conceptualization, including petty and grand corruption and capture of government institutions by pri-
vate interests. Problematically, some data used in studies as general measures of corruption actually
capture a very narrow slice of the universe of all corruption forms falling under the definition, “the use
of public o ce for private gain.” For example, the International Crime Victims Survey asks only about
exposure to bribery [Kennedy, 2014]. A narrow measure used as an indicator of overall level of corrup-
tion in a country will provide inaccurate results because di↵erent countries are marred by corruption in
di↵erent forms or sectors [Knack, 2007, Gingerich, 2013]. The V-Dem Corruption Index minimizes this
problem because it is considerably more comprehensive.
4Resonance is comparable to face validity, the idea that the measure seems like a good translation of the underlying
idea [Trochim and Donnelly, 2001].
5The Afrobarometer is the exception. Depending on the year, it examines corruption among government o cials
generally or among particular groups of o cials and civil servants. The other Barometers are the Arab Barometer,
Asiabarometer, Caucasus Barometer, Former Yugoslavia Barometer, Latinobarometer, New Baltic Barometer, New Europe
(post-communist) Barometer, and the New Russia Barometer.
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While capturing relevant meanings, a valid measure must also exclude irrelevant ones. In other words,
it must exhibit di↵erentiation. The V-Dem corruption indicators clearly di↵erentiate corruption from
other similar behaviors. By specifying government o ceholders, we do not include use of nongovern-
mental positions for private gain, such as the university admissions o cer who takes a bribe in return
for an admission acceptance. Likewise we exclude cases where the position might be public or private.
For example, both independent and state media outlets might accept payments in return for favorable
coverage. By specifying types of personal gain, we also exclude behaviors where there is no evidence of
direct, immediate material gain. For example, buying votes and distributing government jobs can help
an individual secure and remain in a government position but not necessarily enrich himself or herself.
The detailed nature of the survey questions excludes other unethical behaviors, such as adultery, that
do not involve the use of public o ce for private gain. This is also a relative strength of the V-Dem
Corruption Index. Indicators from other datasets are used as measures of the use of public o ce for
private gain, but they include superfluous information. For example, the World Governance Indicators’
Control of Corruption (WGI) mixes electoral corruption, which does not necessarily involve private gain,
along with public sector corruption.
By being both comprehensive and distinguishing, a measure demonstrates fecundity, meaning the
characteristic of “reducing the infinite complexity of reality into parsimonious concepts that capture
something important – something ‘real’ – about that reality” [Gerring, 2001]. To achieve this also
requires coherence. The V-Dem Corruption index does well in this regard. The V-Dem Corruption
Index is a factor index of the six indicators of corruption, which after simple imputation for missing
values provides data for 173 country units for more than 95 years, on average. The six indicators that
compose our index are linked to each other through the common ideas of public o ce, private gain, and
the use of the former for the latter. The coherence of the index is evident from a Bayesian factor analysis
of the six corruption indicators at the level of country-year. The results appear in Table 3.
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INDICATOR LOADINGS (⇤) UNIQUENESS ( )
Executive bribery (v2exbribe) .923 .148
Executive embezzlement (v2exembez) .935 .127
Public sector bribery (v2excrptps) .933 .129
Public sector embezzlement (v2exthftps) .934 .128
Legislative bribery/theft (v2lgcrrpt) .789 .378
Judicial bribery (v2jucorrdc) .832 .308
Note: Entries are factor loadings and uniqueness from a normal theory Bayesian
factor analysis model, run through the MCMCfactanal() command in the MCMC
package for R [Martin et al., 2011]. n=12,128 country years.
Table 3: Measuring Corruption with V-Dem Data (BFA Estimates)
These results provide some evidence that the V-Dem indicators map to the same underlying construct.
All six indicators strongly load on a single dimension, although the fit for both legislative and judicial
corruption is somewhat weaker. This could, however, simply be an artifact of over-representation this
set of indicators gives to executive corruption. While a promising avenue for future research would be to
discern the extent to which there are meaningful di↵erences in types of corruption in particular countries
or sets of countries, for present purposes these results lend support to the notion of corruption as a
largely unidimensional phenomenon at the country level.
A measure should also exhibit consistency. To do so, it must capture the same meaning in multiple
contexts. The V-Dem corruption indicators score well in terms of consistency; they are applicable to
di↵erent empirical contexts, both across place and time. The indicators include numerous su cient
attributes depicting corruption, rather than necessary and su cient attributes, so that they apply to
more places and eras [Gerring, 2001]. For example, bribes might be a common form of corruption in one
location whereas future employment opportunities are a common form elsewhere. Including numerous
possible forms of corruption makes our indicators more broadly applicable and therefore less restrictive
in their application across contexts.6
Finally, the V-Dem corruption indicators and resulting index o↵er casual utility. The index as a
whole is useful in testing causal claims in which corruption is the primary cause or e↵ect. Individual
indicators can be used for more specific theories. By o↵ering measures at di↵erent levels of aggregation
and both specific and general conceptualizations, the V-Dem corruption data are particularly useful for
corruption researchers.
This section shows that the V-Dem corruption data are valid from a theoretical standpoint. The
6We tested this logic in the pilot phase of V-Dem data collection, where country experts from two dissimilar countries
in each region of the world answered our questions and provided feedback. The pilot served as a face validity test of our
corruption construct as well [Trochim and Donnelly, 2001]. We also confirmed the consistency of our indicators through our
own research experiences in Africa, Europe, the former Soviet Union, and North America, investigating both contemporary
and historical periods.
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indicators collectively and individually align with definitions of corruption in the literature, o↵ering
various measures of how public o ce can be used to achieve private gain. In other words, this section
demonstrates that the V-Dem corruption indicators align with shared concepts, to use Schedler’s term.
[Schedler, 2012].
5.2 Data Generation Validity Assessment
As a next step in data validation, we propose assessing the degree to which the data generating process
aligns with shared rules of translation [Schedler, 2012]. We interpret the “rules of translation” broadly
to mean any component of the data generating process. We use two criteria to evaluate this process
at each step: whether it is unbiased and whether it is reliable. In particular, we recommend assessing
dataset management structure, data sources, coding procedures, aggregation methods, and geographic
and temporal coverage. As we walk through these potential sources of bias and unreliability, we evaluate
the V-Dem measures and highlight their strengths and weaknesses relative to other corruption datasests.
5.2.1 Dataset Management Structure
An often overlooked issue regarding data sources and the potential bias they introduce is the leadership
and funding source for the dataset. With regards to corruption datasets, Hawken and Munck [2009b]
find significant di↵erences across data sources based on who is doing the evaluating. They compare
di↵erent corruption datasets to mass surveys about corruption, which they consider the “gold standard”,
an assumption we challenge below. They find commercial datasets are the least correlated with mass
surveys, followed by NGO-managed datasets, followed by surveys of businesses. Expert surveys run by
multilateral development banks are those most highly correlated with the experience-based measures of
corruption found in mass surveys. While this approach might not be the best nor apply to other topics,
the point to be made is that the management of a dataset can a↵ect the data produced.
No unreliability or bias stemming from the V-Dem organizational structure is evident. V-Dem is
an academic venture, led by four professors as PIs and 12 scholars from leading universities in di↵erent
countries, assisted by 37 (mostly) scholars from all parts of the world as regional managers, and the V-
Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg, Sweden, as the organizational and management headquarters.
Funding comes from research foundations and donor countries, mostly in Northern Europe. This seems
to be an unbiased and reliable organizational structure capable of generating unbiased and reliable data.
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5.2.2 Data Sources
A key question to consider when evaluating potential bias and unreliability due to data sources is whether
the data are original or aggregated from di↵erent sources. Datasets that aggregate information from
di↵erent sources multiply biases and measurement errors by including those from each source in their
own index [Treisman, 2007, Herrera and Kapur, 2007, Hawken and Munck, 2009b]. This “polls of
polls” approach also precludes analysis of the correlation across these datasets; the alignment between
them is mechanical, not a sign of independent but aligning data [Hawken and Munck, 2009b]. V-
Dem avoids this problem because it produces original corruption data. This is a strength, relative to
many corruption datasets. Three other datasets aggregate information from di↵erent sources. WGI
uses household and firm surveys and information from businesses, non-governmental organizations, and
public-sector organizations. CPI relies on multiple governance and business climate ratings and surveys.
ICRG’s documentation indicates only that final ratings are determined by its sta↵, but those writing
about ICRG have noted that it relies on surveys and a “network of correspondents with country-specific
expertise” [Knack, 2007, p. 258].7 The nine barometers and three of the other datasets – WVS, GCB,
and BEEPS – collect their own data through surveys.
5.2.3 Coding Procedures
When data are generated by coders, it is important to consider 1) the qualifications and potential biases
of the coders themselves, 2) the transparency and thoroughness of the coding guidelines, and 3) the
procedures for combining coder ratings into a single indicator or index [Treisman, 2007, Martinez i
Coma and van Ham, 2015]. We consider each of these below.
Regarding the coders themselves, several scholars have argued that expert-coded data on corruption
are inferior to citizen-coded or “experience” data [Treisman, 2007, Hawken and Munck, 2009a,b, Donchev
and Ujhelyi, 2014]. Rather than privilege one type of coder over another, we recommend considering
what type of coder is a good match for generating the data of interest and what techniques can reduce
bias and increase reliability. For example, with respect to corruption data, citizen coders o↵er certain
disadvantages. Citizen perceptions of corruption are fundamentally a censored indicator of the latent
variable we actually care about: the level of corruption in a society. Citizens interact with only certain
kinds of o cials and observe certain kinds of corruption. Not only are corruption data obtained from
citizens noisy, they are systematically biased: countries with established institutions, stable incentive
structures, and experienced public o cials will likely have corruption that is more removed from citizens
lives, which means that they will be unable to report observing it on surveys, which in turn means
7For more information about ICRG, see Knack [2007] and Razafindrakoto and Roubard [2010].
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that cross-national measures of corruption based on citizen reports will over-estimate corruption in
consolidating democracies and under-estimate it in stable democracies. The potential disadvantage of
far-removed experts coding conditions in a country can be addressed by relying on experts who are
residents or nationals of the countries.
To what extent do V-Dem coding procedures produce valid corruption data? V-Dem relies on expert
perceptions of corruption. The stringent selection criteria for experts included in V-Dem could o↵set
some of the inherent biases in other datasets based on corruption perceptions. Our experts have been
recruited based on their academic or other credentials as field experts in the area for which they code,
on their seriousness of purpose and impartiality [Coppedge et al., 2014]. Impartiality is not a criterion
to take for granted in political science research. Unsurprisingly, Martinez i Coma and van Ham [2015]
noted that variance in estimates of election integrity (Perceptions of Electoral Integrity dataset) was
significantly higher when one of the coders was a candidate in the election. Understanding who the
coders are and where they may provide biased data is critically important in evaluating data validity.
For V-Dem, at least five experts code each question-year observation for a total of more than 2000
experts assisting us in gathering the data. As a rule, at least three fifths of the experts coding a particular
country either are nationals of or reside in the country in question. We thus tap into a local source of
expertise and knowledge on corruption, avoiding the problem of far-removed experts and also the problem
of citizens within limited experience and information. In order to aggregate up from coders to the level of
country-years, we apply an IRT measurement model that models variation in coder reliability and allows
for the possibility that raters apply ordinal scales di↵erently from one another [Pemstein et al., 2016].
In other words, coders may have varying error rates and be more or less strict than one another when
making ordinal rating decisions. The model also uses bridge raters—who rate multiple countries for many
years—and lateral coders—who, in addition to providing a time-series for one country, provide single-year
ratings for a number of other countries—to calibrate estimates across countries [Pemstein et al., 2014].
Of course, such statistical techniques do not guarantee that our corruption data are unbiased. Therefore,
below, we perform convergent/divergent validity checks and examine how individual-level information
on experts and structural country characteristics explain variation in corruptions ratings, both within
V-Dem, and across multiple datasets.
5.2.4 Aggregation Model
Many datasets o↵er low-level indicators that they combine into higher-level indices. To assess the validity
of the resulting data, it is important to consider a) the choice of indicators to aggregate and b) the
aggregation rule.
With respect to selecting indicators to aggregate into a corruption index, V-Dem was guided by the
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conceptualization of corruption, as described in the content validity section above. This is a relative
strength of V-Dem. Both the WGI and CPI choose indicators that reduce missingness [Hawken and
Munck, 2009b]. V-Dem does not have such a constraint, as the level of missingness does not vary greatly
from one indicator to another.
V-Dem aggregates corruption indicators using a two-stage approach. First, as we briefly describe
above, we use IRT methods to aggregate individual codes into low-level indicators. At the second stage
we use Bayesian factor analysis to aggregate individual measures into a higher-level indices, using the
method of composition [Tanner, 1993] to propagate estimation uncertainty in the first stage into the
resulting indices. In particular, we construct the executive corruption index (v2x execorr) by fitting a
factor analysis model to the indicators for executive bribery (v2exbribe) and executive embezzlement
(v2exembez). The model estimates the posterior distribution of the latent factor score for each obser-
vation (country-year); we use these posterior distributions to produce index point estimates (posterior
averages) and estimates of uncertainty (standard deviations and highest posterior density regions). We
build the public corruption index (v2x pubcorr) similarly, and base the index on the estimated la-
tent factor scores from a model incorporating low-level indicators of public sector bribery (v2excrptps)
and embezzlement (v2exthftps). Finally, to construct the overarching corruption index (v2x corr),
we average (a) the executive corruption index (v2x execorr), (b) the public sector corruption index
(v2x pubcorr), (c) the indicator for legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt), and (d) the indicator for ju-
dicial corruption (v2jucorrdc). In other words, we weight each of these four spheres of government
equally in the resulting index.
5.2.5 Coverage Across Countries and Time
It is important to consider potential biases introduced by limited geographic or temporal coverage of a
dataset [Treisman, 2007]. Particularly with sensitive topics, such as corruption, missing data are likely
not missing at random. Therefore, it is valuable to consider any selection bias introduced in the process
of deciding which cases to include or exclude. When these concerns are allayed, we can be more confident
in conducting analyses across countries and over time. To further assess the validity of cross-country
analysis with a particular dataset, it is important to assess the controls put in place to anchor country
ratings to the same scale, according to Treisman [2007].
By these criteria, the V-Dem corruption measures are highly valid. V-Dem includes every single
country in the dataset, avoiding the bias in datasets of only on a subset of countries - those easiest to
code or those for which coders are readily available. An additional way that V-Dem ensures reliable
and unbiased data is by using the same coder recruitment procedures and data coding methods across
countries and over time. The validity of using V-Dem measures for analysis over time is further en-
Corruption Data Validity 15
hanced by relying on the same set of coders throughout the coded history of each country. To facilitate
cross-national research, V-Dem is in the process of implementing anchoring vignettes across all coders.
Anchoring vignettes serve to reduce cross-coder di↵erences by assessing each coder’s rating scale and
then adjusting the ratings of each coder to be consistent.
The validity of V-Dem corruption measures for analysis across countries and over time is one of the
dataset’s key strengths. By asking the same questions of each coder for each country for each year,
V-Dem allows over-time and cross-country comparisons of corruption levels in the world going all the
way back to 1900. This is an important contribution to the corruption literature in and of itself, since
existing measures of corruption are not designed for panel analysis and yet existing measures are often
used this way.
Most other techniques for generating corruption data tend to be on a smaller scale, their coverage
typically ranging from a single community over a year to a small number of countries for a few years
at most. These sources include 1) measures based on observing corruption (e.g., McMillan and Zoido
[2004], Barron and Olken [2007], or Sequeira and Djankov [2010]); 2) measures based on estimating
corruption by subtracting budget allocations from actual receipts (e.g., Reinikka and Svensson [2003],
Golden and Picci [2005],Olken [2005], Niehaus and Sukhtankar [2013]); 3) measures based on audits of
government accounts (e.g., Ferraz and Finan [2008]); 4) measures based on criminal records (e.g., Teorell
and Rothstein [forthcoming], Peters and Welch [1980], Chang et al. [2010], Goel and Nelson [1998]; and
5) measures based on media reports (e.g., Cox and Kousser [1981], Nyblade and Reed [2008]). With such
limited data, global analysis over time is not possible.
With those datasets that provide (near) global time series data, the validity of the measures for
such analysis is questionable. Measures of corruption are typically taken at the country level, where
comparisons across countries often come at the expense of comparisons over time [Christiane et al., 2006,
Galtung, 2006, Knack, 2007]. For example, WGI is calculated such that the global average is the same
every year, meaning that changes in the level of corruption within a country are not revealed unless the
change is so great as to move it up or down in the comparative rankings [Lambsdor↵, 2007]. Kaufmann
and Kraay [2002] estimate that half the variance in the WGI’s index over time is the product of changes
in the sources and coding rules used rather than actual changes in corruption levels. Treisman [2007]
notes that the aggregation strategies and sources have changed over time for CPI as well. Finally, the
WGI forces a consistent global average over time, preventing by construction an understanding of trends
over time.
To further illustrate the V-Dem Corruption Index’s relative strength, we consider what we can learn
about trends in corruption levels – something other datasets are not designed to do. In Figure 1, we
depict the global trends building on the V-Dem Corruption Index, also including a version where we have
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imputed missing data on the regression line (mostly needed for all country years with no legislature).
The trend depicted in the figure could be somewhat surprising: according to the V-Dem data, corruption
levels have been on the rise globally since at least the 1960s, with a peak just around the time when
corruption started to be on the global agenda for reform. The world thus looks much more corrupt today
than it did 100 or 60 years ago. Since 2000, on the other hand, the level of corruption in the world has
been in slight decline.
We think there are several reasons to believe a global surge in corruption over the latter half of the
19th century makes intuitive sense. For one thing, the world economy is much more monetized than
it was half a century ago. More bank notes exchange hands. That in itself should lead one to expect
higher levels of corruption. Relatedly, the collapse of the Soviet economies in the early 1990s, as well
as a global rise of libertarian values, has led to a flurry in privatization reforms, also known to increase
levels of corruption. Finally, the number of hybrid regimes has been on the rise [Teorell and Hadenius,
2007], and we know from previous studies that corruption levels tend to be highest in countries at the
crossroads between authoritarianism and democracy [Montinola and Jackman, 2002, Sung, 2004, Ba¨ck
and Hadenius, 2008, Rock, 2007, Treisman, 2007, Charron and Lapuente, 2010].
There is however one alternative interpretation of the trend that needs to be taken seriously: reporting
bias. Maybe the perceived increase in corruption is a reflection of the fact that the media reported more
about corruption by the mid-1990s than they did previously. That could imply that the increase is more
a reflection of hearsay than actually increased levels of corruption. More generally, concerns over media
bias are at the forefront of the V-Dem data validation agenda.
In the case of the V-Dem corruption data, two pieces of evidence speak against this interpretation,
or at least makes it unlikely that is the whole story behind the trends. The first is the downward trend
we observe from around the year of 2000. Since there is no reason to expect the media to report less
on corruption over the last decade (if anything more), this speaks directly against the notion that the
increase in the decades preceding this decline should merely be a reflection of reporting bias. Second,
in Figure 2 we present the aggregate trend in corruption levels for a sub-sample of all country years
where there, according to the Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle [2014] measure, was no media freedom.
If reporting bias was driving the upward trend, we should expect a flat line (or perhaps even decline)
in countries where reporting was severely restricted. This is however not the case. Although a more
corrupt sub-sample overall, and only covering the post-WWII period, the upward trend in corruption
across the second half of the 20th century is clearly present also under these conditions. The trajectories
only di↵er after 2000; specifically the decline is not present in countries void of a free press. That should
come as no surprise however.
Evaluating the dataset management structure, data sources, coding procedures, aggregation methods,
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Figure 1: Global Levels of Corruption, 1900-2012
Figure 2: Levels of Corruption in Countries with no Free Media, 1948-2012
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and geographic and temporal coverage of the V-Dem corruption measures provides additional evidence
that they are valid. In particular, it highlights the V-Dem Corruption Index’s value as measure for
comparison across countries and over time. The validity of data generation process is typically not
considered by scholars, but it does illuminate the quality of indicators.
5.3 Convergent Validity Assessment
Our final data validation approach draws from Schedler’s idea of shared realities [Schedler, 2012]. To
what extent do the data to validate correspond to existing knowledge? To answer this question, we
recommend three techniques. First, compare the data to original or existing case studies. Second, with
data aggregated from multiple experts, conduct statistical analyses to compare coders trying to measure
the same thing. Third, conduct statistical analyses to compare the measure being assessed with other
measures. The following section demonstrates the first technique while evaluating the validity of the
V-Dem data. The section after that does the same for the second and third techniques.
5.3.1 Convergent Validity Testing with Case Studies
We applied the first technique to V-Dem data for four countries. Case studies of contemporary Georgia
and Zambia show that the V-Dem data, relative to other corruption datasets, better mirror detailed
descriptions from published accounts of corruption in the countries. Two historical case studies, of Spain
and the U.S., help validate our historical data and thus increase our confidence in our data collection
methods, especially V-Dem e↵orts to recruit experts with historical knowledge. Finally, a comparison of
individual V-Dem corruption indicators and the U.S. case show the value of our approach to disaggregate
the concept of corruption, rather than providing a single measure as other datasets do.
To develop the case studies, a research assistant used scholarly articles and books and intergovern-
mental and nongovernmental reports to describe the extent and nature of corruption generally and,
where possible, in each branch of government and the public sector. The reports he used included
thick descriptions from the World Bank but not its datasets that have corruption measures, WGI and
BEEPS. Importantly, the research assistant did not view the quantitative data from V-Dem or these
other datasets prior to, or while writing, the case studies.
In presenting V-Dem data for the four countries throughout this section, each of the country graphs
includes only the portion of the scale where a country’s corruption scores fall. So that the reader does
not exaggerate changes in corruption in each country—for example, that a decrease indicates an end
to corruption—Figure 3 illuminates the absolute values of corruption in the countries. Specifically, it
includes all four countries with their quite di↵erent levels of corruption for the time periods examined.
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Figure 3: V-Dem’s Corruption Measure for Gambia, Spain, the United States, and Zambia
5.3.1.1 Contemporary Cases: Georgia and Zambia
We focused on Georgia and Zambia from their points of independence, 1991 and 1964 respectively, to
the present. We selected these countries because V-Dem data for these countries di↵er significantly from
those produced by other corruption measures, specifically the WGI and CPI data. For Georgia (Figure
4), V-Dem shows a steep, isolated drop and then a leveling o↵ in corruption, whereas WGI and CPI
mostly portray a gradual, less significant decline with increases during some periods.8 The contrast
among the indices is even greater for Zambia, as Figure 5 demonstrates. For a period, V-Dem and CPI
move in opposite directions with V-Dem also showing a greater magnitude of change. V-Dem also di↵ers
from WGI, which depicts a relatively steady decline in corruption, whereas V-Dem shows more sudden
decreases and an increase in corruption. (Figure 5, for Zambia, also uses a normalized version of each
index.)
For Georgia we find that V-Dem data mirror the thick description from the published accounts, sug-
gesting that they o↵er a more accurate depiction of corruption in the country [Chene, 2011, Engvall,
2012, Huber, 2004, Kukhianidze, 2009, Mitchell, 2009, Shahnazarian, 2012, Alam and Southworth, 2012].
In the early independence period, corruption was rampant as o cials engaged in schemes, often in col-
laboration with organized crime, to enrich themselves and their clients during the socialism-to-market
transformation, according to published accounts. Public sector corruption flourished as economic up-
8Figure 4 uses a normalized version of each index so that they are comparable to each other.
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Figure 4: Corruption in Georgia
heaval encouraged civil servants to take bribes to supplement their meager salaries. The V-Dem data
show high levels of corruption during this period too, as Figure 4 illustrates. In part, the public’s frus-
tration with this corruption sparked the Rose Revolution of 2003, which resulted in the ouster of the
president and a dramatic drop in corruption beginning that year, the publications recount. During his
first year the new president, Mikhail Saakashvili, implemented extraordinary anti-corruption measures,
which included firing all tra c police and large numbers of other civil servants and which accounts indi-
cate were successful. The V-Dem data show a corresponding significant decline in corruption from 2003
to 2004. Sources describe how prosecutions against former government o cials beginning in 2004 and
2005 organized crime legislation reduced corruption. The V-Dem trend line drops again from 2004 and
2006. No significant anti-corruption e↵orts have been undertaken since 2005 and high-level corruption
remains a problem, according to the publications. The V-Dem data reflect this with a leveling o↵ of the
line at a relatively high value in 2006.
The V-Dem data for Zambia also match published accounts of corruption in that country [Chikulo,
2000, Van Donge, 2009, Mbao, 2011, Szeftel, 2000], although not as well as in the case of Georgia.
During Zambia’s First and Second Republic, from independence until 1990, corruption was pervasive
in the country, according to published accounts. Both low-ranking and high-ranking o cials engaged
in bribery or theft of public resources. In particular, quasi-governmental enterprises o↵ered employees
many opportunities to steal resources. The relatively high score on the V-Dem scale reflects this, as seen
Corruption Data Validity 21
Figure 5: Corruption in Zambia
in Figure 5. As the economy worsened in the early 1970s, civil servants increasingly turned to theft of
state resources to augment their salaries; the V-Dem data capture this increase. Since then growth in
corruption can mainly be attributed to the informal practices of government elites. Corruption increased
dramatically in the first years of the Third Republic, according to published reports. Government
o cials used the privatization campaign in this era as an opportunity to further enrich themselves.
Thick descriptions do not mention the decrease in the late 1990s that the V-Dem data depict (as does
WGI with a smaller magnitude, but not CPI). Otherwise, the publications and V-Dem data move in
lockstep for this era. The published accounts allude to a decline in corruption with the 2001 exit of
President Frederick Chiluba and other top o cials who were implicated in theft of state resources.
Corruption in the country then began to increase in 2008 with the election of new presidents then and
also in 2012. The new presidents abandoned genuine anti-corruption e↵orts enabling practices like public
theft to again increase. Essentially, both these later administrations strengthened anticorruption rules
while selectively enforcing those rules, primarily against political opponents. The V-Dem data mirror
this pattern except for showing a small drop in 2011, which the publications do not mention (but the
other indices depict).
Although only two cases, the analysis of Georgia and Zambia boosts our confidence in the V-Dem
data. For these countries, V-Dem data outperform the other indices, which do not capture the trends
revealed in the thick descriptions. The comparison between the V-Dem data and the thick descriptions
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also demonstrates V-Dem’s precision: like thick descriptions, the V-Dem data are able to capture an
increase or decrease within a short time period, such as a year or two.
5.3.1.2 Historical Cases: Spain and the U.S.
We also selected Spain and the U.S. to check the validity of our historical data. Examining historical
periods for Spain and the U.S. allows us to check our data collection methods, which aim to draw on
not only contemporary, but also historical, knowledge of experts. These countries make for challenging
validity tests because the V-Dem data show that corruption levels changed numerous times in the past.
We examine both countries from 1900 and stop with 1988 for Spain and 1955 for the U.S. in order to
capture periods of dramatic change while also keeping the amount of in-depth research manageable. We
do not compare these V-Dem data with other corruption indicators because the others do not provide
historical coverage.
For Spain, we find that the V-Dem data match the detailed accounts scholars have provided (e.g.,
Ben-Ami [1983], Cabrera and del Rey Reguillo [2007], Carr [1980], Heywood [1996], Jime´nez [1998],
Moreno-Luzo´n [2012], Preston [1994], Pujas and Rhodes [2002], Towson [2012]). In the beginning of the
20th century during Primo de Rivera’s rule, corruption increased because his economic plan, involving
the development of industrial monopolies and significant state economic intervention, introduced many
opportunities for illicit personal gain, according to published accounts. Monopoly concessions were
granted and public investments were made to financially benefit the government decision-makers or their
relatives. Government o cials also received bribes in exchange for granting regulatory exceptions or
deciding for a particular party in an economic dispute. With the end to this dictatorship, corruption
levels fell to include only infrequent scams involving smaller numbers of government o cials, published
reports indicate. The V-Dem data correspond with this account, showing that the corruption level
jumped between 1922 and 1923, when Primo de Rivera took power, and fell from its high in 1930, when
he left o ce. With the start of the Franco regime in 1939, corruption began to rise again, according
to scholarly sources. The regime’s economic policies facilitated bribe-taking and theft of government
resources by o cials. The Franco government’s autarchic postwar reconstruction plan required o cials
to ration resources to industries. This resulted in government o cials enriching themselves in a black
market for industrial supplies. To sta↵ reconstruction, the government rapidly hired thousands of people,
and this is thought to have also increased corruption among o cials. Corruption continued through the
end of Franco’s rule in 1975. The corruption resulting from the reconstruction plan subsided slightly
beginning in the 1960s, but government o cials continued to find new ways to enrich themselves. Franco’s
regime did almost nothing to combat corruption: in fact, “Franco seems to have regarded corruption as a
necessary lubrication for the system that had the advantage of compromising many with the regime and
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Figure 6: Corruption in Spain
binding them to it” [Payne, 1987, p. 399]. The V-Dem data are consistent with this thick description;
they depict a sudden rise in corruption in 1939 and then a steady amount of corruption through the
Franco period with the slight decrease from 1960. Franco’s death and the subsequent transition to
democracy in Spain changed the nature of political corruption in the country. Corruption shifted from
government o cials enriching themselves to political parties engaging in illegal schemes to secure funds
for campaigning. The V-Dem Corruption Index does not include measures of campaign fraud so it
correctly shows a sudden decline through the period of Franco’s death and the democratic transition,
reflecting the reduction in government o cials use of public o ce for private gain. In sum, V-Dem data
match detailed descriptions of historical corruption in Spain well.
The U.S case serves two purposes: to illustrate the quality of the V-Dem historical data and to
demonstrate in detail the value of V-Dem’s individual indicators of corruption. Both the V-Dem Cor-
ruption Index and its individual indicators match the details provided by published accounts [Benson
et al., 1978, Grossman, 2003, Menes, 2003, Reeves, 2000, Woodiwiss, 1988].
At the turn of the century, U.S. government bureaucrats were engaged in the theft of state resources
and the exchange of state goods and service for personal material gain. Pocketing money for the awarding
of contracts or lax police enforcement were two such schemes. Beginning in the early 1900s, however, the
country experienced a decline in corruption due to successful reform e↵orts of the Progressive Movement.
During the first years of the new century journalists reported on municipal corruption and many cities
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Figure 7: Corruption in the USA
responded by restructuring local government, although some of the largest cities continued to be ruled by
political machines until the 1950s. At the state level Progressive-era reformers pushed through changes,
such as civil service rules, that helped reduced bribery and theft. The V-Dem Corruption Index depicts
this decrease in corruption, as Figure 7 shows.
After this period of positive change, corruption increased significantly in 1921 with the administra-
tion of Warren Harding. Considered one of the most corrupt U.S. administrations in the 20th century,
Harding’s government, particularly cabinet members and bureaucrats, engaged in bribery and embez-
zlement. Most infamous was Secretary of Interior Albert B. Fall’s role in the Teapot Dome Scandal,
where bribes were paid for secret leases on government oil fields. In the public sector, bribery and theft
were common among personnel in the Veterans Bureau and the Department of Justice. The U.S. ban on
alcoholic beverages during Prohibition helped fuel the corruption during Harding’s administration. Law
enforcement personnel, from sta↵ in the Federal Prohibition Unit to Attorney General Harry Daugherty
himself, took money from liquor smugglers in exchange for lax enforcement and pardons, respectively.
Following Harding’s death in 1923, e↵orts, such as prosecutions, reduced corruption. The V-Dem Cor-
ruption Index approximates this account well, as the previous graph indicates. The data show a small
increase in 1920 but then, like the thick description, a significant increase in 1921 and a dramatic decrease
in 1924. For this period the individual V-Dem indicators diverge, reflecting the published accounts. It is
evident in Figure 8 that most of the increase is attributable to executive and public sector bribery and
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Figure 8: Disaggregated Corruption in the USA
then embezzlement. This period is not characterized by a dramatic increase in legislative corruption, as
is clear from the published reports.9
Illicit practices by U.S. legislators were central to corruption during World War II. New opportunities
for corruption during the war sustained corruption levels. With the end of the war and prosecutions
for the schemes these opportunities subsided. U.S. legislators were the government o cials typically
profiting from these illegal practices. For example, Representative Andrew Jackson May accepted bribes
in exchange for the favorable awarding of military contracts. The V-Dem legislative corruption indicators
captures the dip in corruption that coincided with the end of the war in 1945, evident in Figure 8.
Corruption substantially increased with the Truman administration, which is considered the other
most corrupt government of the 20th century, besides Harding’s. Bureaucrats in numerous agencies used
their positions for personal gain. Tax collectors with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) took bribes
and reduced or ignored tax liabilities in return. High-level bureaucrats, including the IRS commissioner
and general counsel, were involved in this corruption as well as embezzlement schemes. The corruption
extended beyond the IRS to other agencies, including the Federal Housing Agency, whose employees
received monetary inducements to approve illegal activity, and the Defense Department and Maritime
Commission, whose sta↵ benefited from kickbacks on contracts and other agreements. The V-Dem
9The judicial corruption indicator is not included in this analysis of the U.S. because it does not vary during this period,
although it does in later eras.
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data show that corruption increased during the Truman administration, which lasted from 1945 to 1953.
Corruption levels jump in 1950 during his leadership and drop in 1955 after he left o ce. An examination
of individual V-Dem indicators support the scholars’ accounts, showing that public sector bribery and
theft, rather than executive or legislative corruption, were the problem. This is evident from Figure
8. Overall, the V-Dem data present a picture similar to thick descriptions of corruption in the U.S.
historically.
The cases of Spain and the U.S. increase our confidence in our approach to collecting historical data
and the validity of that data. Moreover, the U.S case demonstrates the value of not only the V-Dem
Corruption Index but individual V-Dem corruption indicators. Overall, the validity assessment with case
studies suggests that V-Dem data correspond to existing knowledge well.
5.3.2 Convergent Validity Testing with Statistical Analysis
With expert coded data with multiple experts, there are two fundamentally di↵erent approaches for
assessing convergent validity statistically: (i) the first is to compare di↵erent coders trying to measure
the same thing (i.e., their responses to the same question); (ii) the other is to compare the measure
being assessed with other measures (typically but not necessarily from other datasets). In both cases,
the analysis could consider: (a) the disagreement among coders/measures; or (b) the average di↵erences
between two coders/measures.
5.3.2.1 Comparing Coders
Comparing coders is the approach taken in Steenbergen and Marks [2007], focusing on expert survey data
on party positions for multiple parties in multiple countries, and Martinez i Coma and van Ham [2015],
focusing on expert survey data on election integrity across multiple indicators in multiple countries (both
at a single time point). Both seem to take as their point of departure that by comparing expert survey
responses we can capture validity, the general idea being that the less inter-expert disagreement, or the
less systematic sources of variation in inter-expert judgments, the more valid the data.
Following their lead, we start in Table 4 with a simple variance decomposition of the raw ratings
provided by the V-Dem coders, relying on fixed country- and time-e↵ects (since we are not sampling
either countries or time periods), but with random e↵ects at the coder level. Overall, given that each
of the corruption indicators is on a 0-4 scale, these estimates do not suggest egregious levels of coder
disagreement (recall that they are variances, so the standard deviations would be slightly higher). They
do suggest slightly more coder disagreement than Steenbergen and Marks [2007] (Table 2) estimate for
party positions in Western Europe (0.917 on a 7-point scale equals 0.131 on average), and even more
so compared to the Martinez i Coma and van Ham [2015] (Table 1) estimate for election integrity in a
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Exec. Bribery Exec. Theft Pub. Bribery Pub. Theft Legisl. Corr. Jud. Bribery Pooled
Variance components
Expert 0.814⇤⇤⇤ 0.909⇤⇤⇤ 0.779⇤⇤⇤ 0.851⇤⇤⇤ 0.756⇤⇤⇤ 0.626⇤⇤⇤ 0.495⇤⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.044) (0.037) (0.041) (0.035) (0.030) (0.023)
Indicator 0.358⇤⇤⇤
(0.008)
No of experts 1086 1091 1091 1089 1105 1061 1585
No of observations 79098 79522 79763 79891 60601 76051 454926
Variance decomposition with country- and year-fixed e↵ects, coder- and indicator-random e↵ects.⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 4: Variance Decomposition of Raw Expert Ratings
Exec. Bribery Exec. Theft Pub. Bribery Pub. Theft Legisl. Corr. Jud. Bribery Pooled
Variance components
Expert 0.031⇤⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤⇤ 0.041⇤⇤⇤ 0.053⇤⇤⇤ 0.051⇤⇤⇤ 0.029⇤⇤⇤ 0.027⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Indicator 0.030⇤⇤⇤
(0.001)
No of experts 924 600 903 847 877 872 1346
No of observations 57290 28843 52976 44614 56989 32000 272711
Variance decomposition with country- and year-fixed e↵ects, coder- and indicator-random e↵ects.⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 5: Variance Decomposition of Expert Perception Estimates
global sample (0.217 on average across 49 5-point scales equals 0.043 on average). When pooling across
the six indicators, adding indicator-random e↵ects to the model, the estimate is 0.495 across the experts,
or 0.099 if standardizing by the number of points on the scale. Given that corruption is in principle
a non-observable and also hard to collect information on when going back in time as far as 1900 and
in low-information environments such as authoritarian regimes, we find this level of coder disagreement
low. In the case of Steenbergen and Marks [2007], the coders only look at highly industrialized countries
where there is vast information available about the parties to be rated. In Martinez i Coma and van
Ham [2015], the coding task is also arguably easier given that the surveys were sent out relatively close
to the elections being assessed.
With the IRT measurement model used by V-Dem to aggregate ratings across coders, described
above, we can make a more direct comparison of the extent to which our coders agree or disagree, by
examining their underlying perceived level of corruption (the perceived latent trait) rather than their
actual (raw) ratings. In other words, from the measurement model we can back out the coder-level
estimates once variability in coder thresholds and reliability (error variance) has been controlled for. In
Table 5, we perform the exact same variance decomposition on these adjusted corruption perceptions,
scaled to vary from 0 to 1.10 Again, we do not find the level of coder disagreement to be particularly
high.
Next, again following Steenbergen and Marks [2007] (Table 3), and also Martinez i Coma and van
Ham [2015] (Tables 2 and 4), we suggest testing the assumption that inter-expert disagreement varies
systematically with the level of di culty of the coder task. Thus, apart from concluding that overall
10In order to discount extreme outliers resulting from measurement model uncertainty, all estimates have been weighted
by the inverse of the standard error of the perception estimate.
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expert disagreement is not substantial, Steenbergen and Marks [2007] (p. 354) find that experts agree
more when parties take more di↵erentiated stands, when the issue position is more salient, and the party
is relatively united on the issue – in other words, under conditions that make the judgment task of
experts less di cult. Similarly, Martinez i Coma and van Ham [2015] find that experts agree more on
factual than on evaluative questions, and when asked to assess more observable election day fraud as
compared to pre-election integrity.
In the case of corruption validation, there are first and foremost two potential sources of “level of
di culty” we could expect to a↵ect the degree of coder disagreement. The first relates to the amount
of information on corruption available (e.g., Bollen [1986], Bollen [1993] or Bollen and Paxton [2000],
although on the measurement of human rights abuses and democracy). With V-Dem data, there are (at
least) two ways to proxy for the availability of information on corruption. The first proxy is time: we
would, ceteris paribus, expect the experts to have more information about present-day than historical
corruption, both due to their own lived experience and through the availability of other studies of
corruption, which has arguably sky-rocketed in the last two decades. The second proxy is media freedom
or, more generally, freedom of expression. In closed authoritarian systems, all else being equal, there
should be less information available about corruption, since one of the goals of censorship or government
violations of the freedom of expression is to conceal the extent and nature of corruption in the country.
A second potentially systematic source of variation in coder-level disagreement on corruption is the level
or frequency of corruption in the country in question. Arguably, non-corrupt and outrageously corrupt
settings should elicit less disagreement among coders. The most di cult countries to assess, by contrast,
should be countries that have intermediate levels of corruption.
We test these assertions in Table 6, also controlling for the number of coders, which in itself could be
expected to drive up disagreement (in particular when taking lateral coding into consideration). Except
for time, our expectations are mostly borne out by the data, and our findings are consistent for the raw
ratings and perceptions data (hence, for presentational purposes we omit the results for raw scores).
Coder disagreement is significantly lower in countries with widespread freedom of expression for three
out of six corruption indicators, and also in the pooled analysis. Almost perfectly consistent across all
indicators, the quadratic term for the level of corruption is negative and statistically significant, signifying
that the largest amount of disagreement occurs in countries with intermediate levels of corruption.
The time-variable produces a more mixed pattern. For both raw scores and perceptions, it is negative
and significant for judicial corruption, in line with the expectation that disagreement goes up when
coding the distant past. In the perceptions measure, however, the coe cient is positive and significant
for executive embezzlement, meaning that disagreement actually increases with time. And for the other
four indicators, as well as for the pooled analysis, there is simply no significant e↵ect of time. This result
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exec. Bribery Exec. Theft Pub. Bribery Pub. Theft Legisl. Corr. Jud. Bribery Pooled
Year 0.000 0.000⇤⇤ -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000⇤⇤ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Freedom of expression index -0.052⇤⇤⇤ -0.042 -0.054⇤⇤⇤ -0.055⇤⇤ -0.012 -0.017 -0.039⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.030) (0.018) (0.023) (0.015) (0.022) (0.009)
Level 0.010⇤⇤ -0.001 -0.001 -0.013 0.000 -0.015⇤ -0.003
(0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003)
Level2 -0.051⇤⇤⇤ -0.013 -0.053⇤⇤⇤ -0.031⇤⇤⇤ -0.033⇤⇤⇤ -0.048⇤⇤⇤ -0.042⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
No of coders 0.006⇤ -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Adjusted R-squared 0.321 0.050 0.247 0.184 0.129 0.344 0.234
No of countries 173.000 118.000 168.000 163.000 161.000 169.000 173.000
No of observations 15653 6099 13901 10303 8748 15235 69939
Entries are regression coe cients, with standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses.
Indicator-fixed e↵ects included in the pooled model but omitted from the table.⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 6: Predicting Coder Disagreement
should caution the otherwise intuitive notion that the distant past is necessarily harder to code than
the present. On the one hand, one could expect that with very little information available about an
historical period, each expert’s rating contains more guesswork – that is, a larger random component.
In that sense, less information should lead to more disagreement. On the other hand, more information
about the contemporary era also entails more potential for conflicting information, which could lead
experts to disagree more. With respect to time at least, these two tendencies could cancel each other
out, leading to no obvious patterns with respect to how much our coders disagree.
Overall, we conclude that coder disagreement is not critically high and that the disagreement does
vary by level of di culty in a meaningful way. This lends additional support to the validity of our data.
As a final examination of coders, we can also model the extent to which coder characteristics bias
the coders away from the “true score.” By including country- and year-fixed e↵ects, so we fix the
comparisons to the same countries and time periods, we can model the coder point estimates directly
as a function of coder characteristics. This is the exact approach taken in Dahlstro¨m et al. [2012], who
model expert survey responses to questions on bureaucratic recruitment patterns as a function of gender,
age, education, state employment and whether the expert was born or resides in the country coded.11
Table 7 focus on the exact same coder characteristics as Dahlstro¨m et al. [2012], plus three attitudinal
measures that might tap into ideological biases when coding a country’s level of corruption: support for
a free market; support for the principle of electoral democracy; and support for the principle of liberal
democracy.
These results are overall good news. With few exceptions, coder characteristics do not predict our
coders’ actual ratings or perceived level of executive bribery, holding the frame of comparison (country
and year) constant. In the raw score (results not shown), there is a tendency that female coders rate
countries systematically lower than their male correspondents (meaning more corrupt), but when variable
11It is also very similar in spirit to Martinez i Coma and van Ham [2015] (Table 3), although they look at deviations
from the coder mean with country random e↵ects.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exec. Bribery Exec. Theft Pub. Bribery Pub. Theft Legisl. Corr. Jud. Bribery Pooled
Gender -0.012 -0.068⇤⇤ -0.040⇤⇤ -0.017 -0.011 -0.028⇤ -0.029⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.032) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011)
Age -0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Age2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PhD education 0.005 0.017 0.016 -0.009 -0.015 0.016 -0.004
(0.021) (0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012)
Government employee -0.064⇤⇤ 0.066 0.021 0.030 -0.022 -0.002 0.001
(0.028) (0.043) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.021)
Born in country 0.009 0.031 0.051⇤⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤ 0.024⇤ 0.001 0.024⇤
(0.018) (0.027) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.024) (0.012)
Resides in country 0.019 0.026 -0.002 -0.004 -0.012 0.038⇤ 0.018
(0.018) (0.034) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.021) (0.013)
Supports free market -0.002 0.014⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤ 0.007 0.013⇤⇤ 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Supports electoral democracy 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.003 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005)
Supports liberal democracy -0.011 -0.004 -0.003 -0.013⇤ -0.013⇤ 0.001 -0.007
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
Mean coder discrimination (beta) 0.012 -0.005 -0.011 -0.028⇤⇤ -0.022⇤ 0.004 -0.010
(0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007)
R-squared 0.627 0.587 0.644 0.625 0.617 0.570 0.529
No of countries 173.000 119.000 168.000 163.000 161.000 169.000 173.000
No observations 70471 28258 64223 47982 41395 66937 319266
Entries are regression coe cients, with standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses.
Year- and country-fixed e↵ects included, indicator-fixed e↵ects in the pooled model, but omitted
from the table.⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 7: Predicting Coder Ratings with Coder Traits
thresholds and coder reliability has been taken into consideration, the gender di↵erences (presented) are
only significant for three out of six indicators (although also in the pooled model). There is also a slight
tendency among coders born in the country to rate that country as less corrupt than coders born in
other countries, but this tendency only reaches conventional levels of statistical significance for two out
of six indicators (and not in the pooled model).
There is also a tendency among free market believers to both rate and perceive countries as less
corrupt, but not in the pooled model. And, interestingly, there is no inherent “democratic” bias in our
coders’ perceptions of corruption (neither of the electoral or liberal type). As a final check on ideological
bias, we also test for a potential form of bias that Bollen and Paxton [2000] call “situational closeness”,
or the idea that “judges will be influenced by how situationally and personally similar a country is to
them” (p. 72). In other words, we could test whether ideological bias is geared towards certain types of
countries. One could for example imagine that a strong believer in free markets would have no general
tendency to rate countries as more or less corrupt, but a more specific tendency to rate countries with
free markets as less corrupt. In other words, we might want to assess ideological bias conditional on
country characteristics of the country being rated.
With the three measures of ideological bias available, there are three such interaction e↵ects we
might assess: one between support for free markets and a proxy for openness to trade (data from the
Correlates Of War project); the other two between support for electoral/liberal democracy and the level
of electoral/liberal democracy (data from V-Dem).12
12However, this test comes at a price: we cannot control for country-fixed e↵ects. This means we will either have to
revert to random e↵ects, or simply assume that the country characteristics control for the relevant di↵erences between
countries in terms of average ideological bias of the coders. The latter approach is taken here. (Results for raw scores,
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exec. Bribery Exec. Theft Pub. Bribery Pub. Theft Legisl. Corr. Jud. Bribery Pooled
Supports free market 0.011 0.035⇤⇤ 0.022⇤⇤ 0.024⇤ 0.008 0.018⇤ 0.019⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009)
Openness to trade 0.000⇤⇤ 0.000 0.000⇤⇤⇤ 0.000⇤⇤ 0.000 0.000⇤⇤⇤ 0.000⇤⇤⇤
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Supports free market⇥Openness to
trade
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Supports electoral democracy -0.042 -0.027 -0.019 -0.026 -0.078⇤⇤ -0.027 -0.032⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021) (0.032) (0.023) (0.014)
Electoral democracy index -0.083 0.165 0.234 -0.064 -0.412⇤ -0.246 -0.038
(0.220) (0.231) (0.179) (0.247) (0.249) (0.232) (0.155)
Supports electoral
democracy⇥Electoral democracy
index
0.053 -0.016 0.015 0.035 0.119⇤⇤ 0.100⇤⇤ 0.041
(0.048) (0.037) (0.036) (0.056) (0.055) (0.048) (0.028)
Supports liberal democracy -0.008 0.048 0.023 0.022 0.000 0.016 0.015
(0.031) (0.036) (0.021) (0.024) (0.032) (0.024) (0.018)
Liberal component index 0.582⇤⇤⇤ 0.521⇤ 0.552⇤⇤⇤ 0.748⇤⇤⇤ 0.620⇤⇤⇤ 0.463⇤⇤ 0.605⇤⇤⇤
(0.198) (0.298) (0.147) (0.162) (0.191) (0.193) (0.144)
Supports liberal democracy⇥Liberal
component index
0.011 -0.055 -0.019 -0.031 -0.032 -0.006 -0.023
(0.043) (0.063) (0.032) (0.031) (0.045) (0.034) (0.025)
R-squared 0.466 0.274 0.527 0.444 0.313 0.401 0.408
No of countries 148.000 108.000 144.000 143.000 140.000 149.000 149.000
No of observations 40548 22057 38177 34840 30567 38495 204684
Entries are regression coe cients, with standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses.
Year-fixed e↵ects included, indicator-fixed e↵ects in the pooled model, but omitted from the table.⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 8: Predicting Coder Ratings with Coder and Country Traits
Results omitting all other coder characteristics are presented in Table 8. Again, these results are quite
reassuring, and di↵er very little between raw scores and coder perceptions. That more “liberal” countries,
which among other things mean that they abide by the rule of law, are considered as less corrupt on
average should hardly come as a surprise. More importantly, there is no tendency among coders who
strongly support this “liberal” principle to code or perceive more liberal countries di↵erently than coders
who do not exhibit such support. Similarly, more open economies are considered less corrupt, but this
has no e↵ect on how free market ideological bias a↵ects coder perceptions. The one coder-country
interaction we find that is statistically significant for both raw scores and perceptions is for electoral
democracy and legislative corruption, where there is a tendency that strong believers in the principle of
electoral democracy rate countries with high levels of electoral democracy as having less corruption in
the legislature. There is also a similar tendency in the perceptions for judicial corruption. With these
exceptions noted, there seems to be no overall ideological bias induced by the context of the country
being coded.
5.3.2.2 Comparing Measures
We now turn to a systematic comparison of how countries are rated according to the V-Dem Corruption
Index on the one hand, and the WGI and CPI on the other. Assessing this second type of convergent
validity is fundamentally about assessing comparative advantage: When embarking on using a dataset or
measure for the first time, what are its strengths and weaknesses compared to existing datasets? What
is gained by using this dataset instead of others?
where they can be tested, are very similar in spirit when run with country-random e↵ects).
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Figure 9: Comparing the V-Dem and WGI Measures of Corruption
Since the non-V-Dem data sources explicitly discourage comparisons over time, we perform these
comparisons on a year-by-year basis, starting in the first year of measurement for the corresponding
measure (1995 and 1996). As the simple bivariate scatterplots of Figure 9 and 10 make clear, the V-Dem
measure overall aligns well with the other two. The pooled correlation coe cients are around .90 in
both cases. In other words, countries rated as more corrupt by extant measures of corruption also to
a large extent tend to be rated as more corrupt by the V-Dem index. This is thus clear evidence of
convergent validity. Despite di↵erences in exact question wording and methodology, the V-Dem measure
of corruption paints an overall picture very similar to the ones from WGI and CPI.
However, the figures also make it clear that there are exceptions to the rule. Some countries, such as
Malaysia and Qatar, are systematically rated as more corrupt by the V-Dem index than by other extant
measures. Others, such as Latvia and Lithuania, are consistently considered less corrupt. This opens
the question of what can explain the deviations. Explaining areas that lack convergence is as, or more,
important as demonstrating strong correlations [Adcock, 2001, Bowman et al., 2005]. Put in technical
terms, what can explain the residuals – the vertical distance to the regression line – in the year-by-
year comparisons in Figure 9 and Figure 10? As Hawken and Munck [2009b] notes, “Consensus is not
necessarily indicative of accuracy and the high correlations by themselves do not establish validity.”
In Table 9 and Table 10, we extend the analysis of the e↵ect of coder-level determinants to explaining
deviations from the alternative corruption measure with the broadest coverage: WGI. We thus still
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Figure 10: Comparing the V-Dem and CPI Measures of Corruption
operate at the individual coder-level of analysis, in order to avoid the ecological fallacy that would
have resulted from running regressions on average coder characteristics across countries and years. We
look at individual-level associations between coder characteristics and the tendency to code each V-
Dem corruption indicator di↵erently than the overall WGI measure, while controlling for average coder
characteristics (or, as it were, the “composition” of V-Dem coders for each country). We also control
for the aggregate country and year-level of disagreement among coders, the number of coders, their
individual reliability (as measured by beta from the measurement model), and year-fixed e↵ects.
As should be expected, there is a close correspondence between the WGI measure and our V-Dem
corruption indicators. A unit increase in the WGI measure, roughly corresponding to a standard devia-
tion, maps to an average increase in our corruption estimates by 0.215, roughly half a standard deviation.
But beyond this, there is also a statistically significant tendency among V-Dem female coders to perceive
the countries they are coding as scoring lower (meaning more corrupt) than the WGI measure on three
of our six indicators, including the pooled one. It should be noted that this systematic pattern is not
necessarily a sign of bias of the V-Dem measure. To the best of our knowledge, corruption perception
measures have not been gendered before, but to the extent that incorporating more female views of
corruption brings a less distorted picture of the true nature of corruption in the world, the female “bias”
in the V-Dem data might be seen as a virtue. This is a topic worthy of further study.13
13Interestingly, the gender composition is signed in the opposite direction, meaning that the larger the share of female
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exec. Bribery Exec. Theft Pub. Bribery Pub. Theft Legisl. Corr. Jud. Bribery Pooled
WGI control of corruption 0.245⇤⇤⇤ 0.144⇤⇤⇤ 0.258⇤⇤⇤ 0.238⇤⇤⇤ 0.189⇤⇤⇤ 0.240⇤⇤⇤ 0.215⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.022) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009)
Gender -0.043⇤⇤ -0.119⇤⇤⇤ -0.040⇤⇤ -0.004 -0.025 -0.016 -0.041⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.035) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.013)
Share female coders 0.168⇤⇤ 0.114 0.100 0.168⇤⇤ -0.021 0.111 0.129⇤⇤
(0.069) (0.118) (0.077) (0.070) (0.079) (0.073) (0.056)
Age 0.007 -0.005 0.001 0.007 0.010 -0.004 0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003)
Age2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average age of coders -0.004 0.013 0.033⇤ 0.004 0.041 0.045 0.031
(0.019) (0.041) (0.020) (0.022) (0.031) (0.027) (0.021)
Average age of coders⇥Average age
of coders
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PhD education -0.018 0.021 -0.007 -0.055⇤⇤ -0.007 0.039 -0.007
(0.021) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.013)
Share of PhD coders 0.062 -0.173⇤ -0.053 0.036 -0.036 -0.101 -0.023
(0.064) (0.097) (0.069) (0.061) (0.076) (0.064) (0.045)
Government employee -0.020 -0.021 0.055 -0.004 -0.011 0.039 0.009
(0.031) (0.050) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.027) (0.017)
Share of coders employed
by government
-0.062 -0.139 -0.091 -0.122 0.167 -0.114 -0.042
(0.111) (0.214) (0.116) (0.116) (0.135) (0.103) (0.078)
Born in country -0.036 0.005 0.034⇤ 0.029 0.017 -0.014 -0.001
(0.027) (0.036) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.014)
Share of coders born in country 0.124⇤ 0.059 0.065 0.092 -0.195⇤⇤ -0.108 -0.002
(0.066) (0.121) (0.065) (0.072) (0.090) (0.091) (0.060)
Resides in country 0.013 0.008 -0.007 0.016 -0.022 0.049⇤ 0.014
(0.029) (0.039) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.016)
Share of coders residing in country -0.054 0.129 -0.122⇤ -0.082 0.202⇤⇤⇤ 0.054 0.036
(0.073) (0.126) (0.069) (0.073) (0.075) (0.086) (0.060)
Supports free market 0.010 0.014 0.018⇤⇤ 0.018⇤ 0.009 0.009 0.012⇤
(0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007)
Average free market support -0.043 -0.047 -0.045 -0.021 -0.071⇤⇤ -0.001 -0.034
(0.029) (0.035) (0.031) (0.026) (0.032) (0.027) (0.023)
Supports electoral democracy 0.005 -0.031⇤⇤ 0.004 -0.008 -0.008 0.008 -0.006
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006)
Average electoral
democracy support
0.007 -0.012 -0.004 -0.011 -0.022 -0.029 -0.016
(0.032) (0.057) (0.038) (0.040) (0.053) (0.042) (0.033)
Supports liberal democracy -0.012 0.006 0.000 -0.002 -0.012 0.001 -0.006
(0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006)
Average liberal democracy support 0.002 0.033 -0.000 0.015 0.034 0.037 0.018
(0.033) (0.043) (0.034) (0.032) (0.045) (0.035) (0.026)
Mean coder discrimination (beta) -0.043⇤⇤⇤ -0.042⇤⇤ -0.031⇤⇤⇤ -0.061⇤⇤⇤ -0.045⇤⇤⇤ 0.012 -0.033⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.008)
Coder disagreement 0.263⇤ 0.406⇤⇤ 0.419⇤⇤⇤ 0.251⇤⇤ 0.538⇤⇤⇤ 0.292⇤ 0.238⇤⇤
(0.142) (0.198) (0.155) (0.113) (0.206) (0.162) (0.100)
No of coders -0.000 -0.017 0.009 0.014 -0.005 -0.025⇤⇤ -0.002
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006)
r2 a 0.607 0.343 0.656 0.590 0.482 0.548 0.518
N clust 163.000 114.000 159.000 154.000 151.000 160.000 164.000
Observations 10032 6619 9684 9333 8998 9569 54235
Entries are regression coe cients, with standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses.
Year-fixed e↵ects included, indicator-fixed e↵ects in the pooled model, but omitted from the table.⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 9: Explaining Deviations from the WGI Corruption Measure with Coder Traits
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exec. Bribery Exec. Theft Pub. Bribery Pub. Theft Legisl. Corr. Jud. Bribery Pooled
WGI control of corruption 0.216⇤⇤⇤ 0.094⇤⇤⇤ 0.196⇤⇤⇤ 0.182⇤⇤⇤ 0.156⇤⇤⇤ 0.204⇤⇤⇤ 0.174⇤⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.034) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.015)
Supports free market 0.009 0.021 0.016 0.027⇤⇤ -0.001 0.008 0.012
(0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009)
Openness to trade -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Supports free market
⇥Openness to trade
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000⇤ 0.000 0.000⇤ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Supports electoral democracy -0.037 -0.027 -0.015 0.004 -0.057⇤ -0.014 -0.036⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.038) (0.024) (0.035) (0.034) (0.026) (0.017)
Electoral democracy index -0.104 -0.960 -0.668 -0.946 -1.569⇤⇤ -1.558⇤⇤ -0.753
(0.605) (1.001) (0.732) (0.773) (0.614) (0.657) (0.573)
Supports electoral
democracy⇥Electoral
democracy index
0.071 -0.019 0.015 -0.032 0.093⇤ 0.048 0.047⇤
(0.046) (0.064) (0.039) (0.057) (0.056) (0.047) (0.028)
Supports liberal democracy -0.037 0.029 0.002 -0.049⇤ -0.027 0.029 -0.016
(0.034) (0.047) (0.023) (0.027) (0.033) (0.024) (0.020)
Liberal component index 0.079 -0.466 0.549⇤ 0.493 0.404 -0.201 0.438
(0.353) (0.662) (0.324) (0.354) (0.417) (0.394) (0.316)
Supports liberal democracy⇥Liberal
component index
0.043 -0.028 0.007 0.080⇤⇤ 0.032 -0.055 0.019
(0.044) (0.070) (0.034) (0.039) (0.048) (0.040) (0.028)
Adjusted R-squared 0.628 0.381 0.682 0.608 0.506 0.598 0.540
No of countries 144.000 106.000 140.000 139.000 135.000 145.000 145.000
No of observations 7500 5072 7257 7056 6686 7207 40778
Entries are regression coe cients, with standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses.
Year-fixed e↵ects included, indicator-fixed e↵ects in the pooled model, but omitted from the table.⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 10: Explaining Deviations from the WGI Corruption Measure with Coder and Country Traits
Apart from this, there are very few systematic patterns pertaining to coder-level characteristics (when
running so many statistical tests, we should of course expect some coe cients to be significant by chance).
There is however a tendency across almost all indicators that country years where the V-Dem coders
disagree end up being coded as less corrupt than the WGI measure. This could be something to keep in
mind for future users of our data. Yet overall, the pattern is clear: there are few indications of systematic
bias in our deviations from the WGI measure of corruption.
This also goes, finally, for the country-coder interactions tested in Table 10, that seek to determine
whether deviations between V-Dem and WGI measures of corruption accrue from “situational closeness”
as per above. Focusing on only the interaction terms, there is just one instance in which we find an e↵ect
that reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. This is for public sector theft or embezzlement
(v2exthftps), where the V-Dem coders have a tendency to rate more liberal countries as less corrupt
than WGI the stronger they themselves believe in liberal democracy. This is however a rare exception to
a very strong rule: that there are no evident signs of context- or “similarity”-induced ideological biases
in the V-Dem perceptions of corruption.
In sum, the results from these statistical analyses speak in favor of the validity of the V-Dem in-
dicators. First, the degree of coder disagreement is comparatively small; and, when disagreement does
exist, it varies meaningfully by context. Second, with the infrequent exception of gender, coders are
not systematically a↵ected by background or ideological factors. Finally, our V-Dem indicators correlate
strongly with other measures of corruption, and the deviations from those measures cannot, by and large,
coders, the less corrupt the country (as compared to WGI). While highlighting the importance of controlling for ecological
correlations, we interpret this as reflecting the fact that we have more female coders in developed, and hence less corrupt,
countries.
Corruption Data Validity 36
be explained by the background traits or composition of V-Dem coders.
6 Conclusion
Greater attentiveness to data quality can improve political science research. This practical guide to data
validation is a step in that direction. Rather than abstract advice or suggestions relevant only to creating
a dataset, this guide describes and demonstrates an approach and tools to assess the strengths and weak-
ness of existing datasets so that researchers can judge which dataset to use and how. Specifically, our
method helps reveal systematic and random measurement error, in order to judge the validity and relia-
bility of measures, respectively. To do so, we advocate for three approaches, each incorporating multiple
tools: 1) assessing content validity through an examination of the resonance, domain, di↵erentiation, fe-
cundity, and consistency of the measure, 2) evaluating data generation validity through an investigation
of dataset management structure, data sources, coding procedures, aggregation methods, and geographic
and temporal coverage, and 3) assessing convergent validity using case studies and comparisons among
coders and among measures.
Our application of this method to the V-Dem corruption measures demonstrates that they have high
validity. It is nonetheless good to be aware of the set of country-year observations where our data are less
reliable, as evidenced by less coder convergence. Users should consider the implications of our finding
regarding female coders for a few of the indicators: a finding that could suggest more accurate data
relative to those data generation processes that are less representative. The results have shown that
researchers can be confident in using the V-Dem corruption measures for analyses across countries and
over time. This advantage is significant considering that research questions have required such analyses
and yet other datasets have not been designed for this purpose. Thus, the V-Dem corruption data have
the potential to advance our understanding of corruption trends and causes considerably.
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